Abstract-Numerous routing protocols have been proposed for wireless networks. A common assumption made by the majority of these protocols is that each wireless node will follow the prescribed protocol without any deviation. This may not be true in practice since wireless nodes could be owned by users who perform in their own interests. We then have to design routing protocols that still work properly even for networks composed of selfish nodes. In this paper, we propose a unicast routing protocol to address this issue under the assumption that all networking nodes are rational. Here, a node is rational if it always chooses a strategy that maximizes its benefit. We assume that each node has a privately known cost of relaying a unit of data for other nodes. In our protocol, each wireless node has to declare a cost for forwarding a unit of data. When a node wants to send data to the access point, it first computes the least cost path to the access point and then computes a payment to each node on this path. We present a pricing mechanism such that the profit of each relay node is maximized when it declares its true cost. We also give a time optimal method to compute the payment in a centralized manner. We then discuss in detail how to implement the routing protocol in the distributed manner. We conduct extensive simulations to study the ratio of the total payment over the total cost incurred by all relay nodes. We find that this ratio is small in practice. Our protocol works when the wireless nodes will not collude and we show that no truthful mechanism can avoid the collusion of any pair of two nodes. We also give a truthful mechanism when a node only colludes with its neighbors.
INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS networks have become increasingly important with the requirement for enhanced data and multimedia communications in ad hoc environments. While infrastructured networks are common, there are a growing number of applications that require multihop infrastructureless mobile wireless networks. In a multihop wireless network, each wireless node can only send signal to nodes within some transmission range.
A source node communicates with far off destinations by using intermediate nodes as relays. A common assumption made by the majority of the wireless ad hoc routing protocols is that each wireless node will follow the prescribed protocols without any deviation, e.g., a node is always assumed to relay data packets for other nodes if it is asked to do so by the routing protocols. However, this may not be true in reality: The wireless nodes could be owned by individual users and, thus, they will perform in their own interests. The wireless nodes are often powered by batteries only, thus it is not in the best interest of a wireless node to always forward the data packets for other nodes. If a node refuses to relay the data while the routing protocol assumed that it will, the throughput of the network may decrease and even the network connectivity may be broken de facto. In other words, selfish wireless nodes may hinder the functioning of the network completely. Thus, a stimulation mechanism is required to encourage the users to provide service to other nodes.
Dealing with selfish users has been well-studied in game theory and economics. Recently, there have been a sequence of results [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] published in the theoretical computer science area that tried to solve various problems when the agents are selfish and rational. Here, an agent is rational if it always chooses a strategy that maximizes its own gain. A common setting in all these results is that each agent incurs a cost if it is selected to provide the service. For example, in wireless networks, each node will incur an energy cost (and possibly memory cost) when it is asked to relay the data for other nodes. Several protocols [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] have also been proposed recently to address the noncooperative issue in wireless ad hoc networks. Some protocols [7] , [10] , [11] pay the relay node a virtual nuglet when it relays a data packet for other nodes and charge the source node h nuglets when it initiates a unicast with h-hops. However, the concept of nuglet does not reflect the actual cost of a node relaying the data packet and, thus, nodes may still refuse to relay data packets. In this paper, we are interested in designing a routing protocol that will compensate a relaying node with a monetary value that is at least its actual cost.
We consider a set of wireless nodes V ¼ fv 0 ; v 1 ; Á Á Á ; v nÀ1 g. Each node v i is associated with an average cost c i to forward a data packet and this cost is only known to node v i itself. Here, the cost c i may also include the minimum amount of profit z i that node v i wants to make if it is chosen to relay packets for other nodes. For simplicity, in this paper, we assume that the cost c i is fixed and node v i knows this monetary value. This is also a common assumption made in all mechanism design results [4] , [6] , [14] that can achieve strategyproofness. If its cost changes, node v i has to declare this new cost, as we will see later, so its profit is maximized. Notice that our results can be simply extended to the scenario when c i reflects the cost of node v i relaying data for one communication session instead of a data packet.
We assume that, in order to stimulate cooperation among all wireless nodes, every wireless node is willing to pay other nodes for relaying its data to and from the access point (or other wireless nodes in general). For simplicity, we use the access point as the sole destination. We will use node v 0 to represent the access point of the wireless network to the wired network and, in addition, the routing from each node to the access point is connection-oriented. Our routing protocol works as follows: First, each node v j in the network declares a cost d j for relaying a data packet of unit size, which could be different from its true cost c j . Second, the source node v i computes the least cost path (LCP), denoted by Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ, from v i to the access point v 0 according to the declared cost vector d ¼ ðd 0 ; d 1 ; Á Á Á ; d nÀ1 Þ. After that, a payment p j i ðdÞ to node v j is computed (either in a centralized or in a distributed way) for every node v j . The data is then routed along the computed LCP. Each node on the LCP is asked to relay the data packets and is compensated by the computed payment. The utility or called profit by some researchers of node v j is u j ðdÞ ¼ p j i ðdÞ À c j if node v j relays data for v i ; otherwise, it is p j i ðdÞ. Naturally, it is preferred that each node v j declares a cost d j ¼ c j (called truthful or strategyproof in this paper). Since we assumed that wireless nodes are selfish and rational, there is no guarantee that any wireless node will reveal its cost truthfully unless it is convinced that it cannot do better by declaring a different cost. The first objective of this paper is then to design a payment scheme such that each node v j will always maximize its profit when it declares its true cost, i.e., d j ¼ c j , no matter what other wireless nodes do. The second objective of this paper is to implement the protocol efficiently and truthfully.
By assuming that the nodes will not collude with each other, we present a strategyproof pricing mechanism such that the profit of each wireless node is maximized when it declares its true cost. In our protocol, the payment to a node v k on the LCP is d k plus the difference between the cost of the least cost path without using v k and the cost of the least cost path. The payment to any node not on the LCP is always 0. Our protocol does not need the routing to be performed repeatedly. To simplify our analysis, we assume that the network topology remains the same for the period of routing of current traffic request from a source node to the access point. Our main contributions of this paper are follows: First, we present a centralized method to compute the payment in time Oðn log n þ mÞ, where n is the number of wireless nodes, and m is the number of wireless links. Clearly, this is asymptotically optimum since we have to spend Oðn log n þ mÞ time just to compute a least cost path for routing. Second, we discuss in detail how to implement our routing protocol in a distributed manner. Notice that it is not straightforward that we can implement a protocol in a distributed manner, even without considering the communication complexity. The difficulty here is how to rely on these selfish wireless nodes to truthfully implement our protocols that will prevent them from lying about its cost. Notice that since we pay more than its actual cost of a node to relay the data packets, the total payment to all node's relaying packets is clearly at least the same as the actual cost of the least cost path. It is easy to construct a worst-case example in which we could pay much more than the actual cost. We then conduct extensive simulations to study the ratio of the payment to all relay nodes by the source node over the total cost incurred by all relay nodes. We studied both the ratio averaged for all source nodes and the maximum ratio among all source nodes. We find that these ratios are all small when the cost of wireless nodes are randomly distributed in an interval.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly discuss what is algorithmic mechanism design and what is the network model used in this paper and formally define the problem we want to solve. We present our pricing mechanism in Section 3. We discuss in detail how to compute the payment fast and how to compute it in a distributed manner. In Section 4, we show that there is no pricing mechanism that can prevent an arbitrary pair of nodes from colluding. We then give a mechanism that can prevent the neighbors from colluding with each other. We also study the case when the cost is incurred on communication links instead of wireless nodes. We conduct extensive simulations to show that the overpayment to the relay nodes according to the pricing scheme is small compared with the actual cost of the least cost path. We review the priori arts on dealing with noncooperative computing and wireless networks in Section 5. We conclude our paper in Section 6 with a discussion of possible future works.
TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES

Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Conventionally, in economics and mechanism design theory, the scenarios in which the agents act according to their own self-interests are modeled as follows: There are n agents and each agent i, for i 2 f1; Á Á Á ; ng, has some private information t i , called its type. [18] proved that a VCG mechanism is truthful. Green and Laffont [19] proved that, under mild assumptions, VCG mechanisms are the only truthful implementations for utilitarian problems.
Let a Ài denote the vector of strategies of all agents except i, i.e., a Ài ¼ ða 1 ; a 2 ; Á Á Á ; a iÀ1 ; a iþ1 ; Á Á Á ; a n Þ:
; Á Á Á ; a n Þ, i.e., each agent j 6 ¼ i uses strategy a j , except that the agent i uses strategy b.
Network Model
We consider a set V ¼ fv 0 ; v 1 ; Á Á Á ; v nÀ1 g of n wireless nodes. Here, v 0 is used to represent the access point (AP) of the wireless network. Let G ¼ ðV ; EÞ be the communication graph defined by V , where E is the set of links ðv i ; v j Þ such that the node v i can communicate directly with the node v j . We assume that G is node biconnected. In other words, the remaining graph, by removing any node v i and its incident links from G, is still connected. The biconnectivity of the communication graph G will prevent the monopoly of nodes as will see later in addition to provide fault tolerance. In wireless networks, if two nodes cannot communicate directly, they communicate through multihop wireless links by using some intermediate nodes to relay the message. Consequently, each node in the wireless network also acts as a router to forward data packets for other nodes. We assume that each wireless node v i has a fixed cost c i of relaying/sending a data packet to any (or all) of its outgoing neighbors. This cost c i is a private information, only known to node v i . All n nodes together define a cost vector c ¼ ðc 0 ; c 1 ; Á Á Á ; c nÀ1 Þ, which is the profile of the network G. When a node v i wants to make a guaranteed profit z i , its declared "cost" should be c i þ z i . It will be seen later that node v i makes a profit at least z i when it is chosen to relay the data. In the remaining of our study, we assume that the source node will always pay the relay nodes for relaying its data, i.e., the source node has an infinitely large valuation of the data being sent to the destination. Our results can be easily extended to deal with the case when the source node v i has a fixed valuation b i of the data being sent to the destination. The source node chooses to send the data via relay nodes if and only if the total payments to all these relay nodes is no more than b i . It is easy to show that the source node will also be truthful about b i .
In this paper, we restrict our attentions to a unicast between any node v i and the access point v 0 only. Our results can be easily extended to the routing between an arbitrary pair of source node v i and destination node v j .
Statement of Problem
If a node v i wants to send data to the access point v 0 , typically, the least cost path (with minimum total relaying cost) from node v i to node v 0 , denoted by Pðv i ; v 0 ; cÞ, is used to route the packets. Consider a path Åði; 0Þ ¼ v rs ; v rsÀ1 ; Á Á Á v r1 ; v r0 connecting node v i and node v 0 , i.e., v r s ¼ v i and v r 0 ¼ v 0 , and node v r j can send signal directly to node v r jÀ1 . The cost of the path Åði; 0Þ is defined as P sÀ1 j¼1 v rj , which excludes the costs of the source node and the target node.
To stimulate cooperation among all wireless nodes, node v i pays some nodes of the network to forward the data to the access point. Thus, each node v j on the network declares a cost d j , which is its claimed cost to relay the packets. Note that, here, d j could be different from its true cost c j . Then, node v i computes the least cost path Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ to connect to the access point v 0 according to the declared cost vector ; 1g indicates whether v j relays the packet for v i . We always assume that the wireless nodes are rational: It always tries to maximize its utility u j ðdÞ. We assume that the cost c i is based on per packet or per session, whichever is appropriate. If the cost is per packet and a node v i wants to send s packets to the access point v 0 in one session, then the actual payment of v i to a node v k is s Á p k i for that session. If the payment scheme is not well-designed, a node v j may improve its utility by lying its cost, i.e., declares a cost d j 6 ¼ c j . The objective of this paper is then to design a payment scheme such that each node v j maximizes its utility as long as it declares its true cost, i.e., d j ¼ c j . Using the standard assumption from economic model, we assume that the wireless nodes do not collude to improve their utilities. We will relax this assumption later.
THE PRICING MECHANISM
Payment Scheme
Assume that the node v i has to send packets to v 0 through the relay of some other nodes. It pays these relay nodes to compensate their costs for carrying the transit traffic incurred by v i . The output OðdÞ of the mechanism is the path connecting v i and v 0 with the minimum cost, which is known as Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ. The payment to a node v k is 0 if v k 6 2 Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ. Otherwise, its payment is
Here, P Àv k ðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ denotes the least cost path between node v i and v 0 without using node v k , and kÅk denotes the total cost of a path Å.
This payment falls into the VCG mechanism, so it is strategy-proof. In other words, if d k ¼ c k , node v k maximizes its utility p k i ðdÞ À x k ðiÞ Á c k . Every node participating in the relay will have a nonnegative profit; every node that does not relay the traffic will have profit 0. Notice that when a node originally is not chosen with its true cost, its profit will become negative if it tries to lie its cost such that it is chosen. Clearly, to make sure that the payment is well-defined, we need that the network is biconnected, i.e., the path P Àv k ðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ does exist. Otherwise, node v k can charge a monopoly price since it is a critical node to connect v i and v 0 .
Designing a truthful payment scheme for unicast is straightforward. One of our main contributions in this paper is a time optimal centralized method to compute the payment, which will be described in detail in the following section.
Fast Payment Computing
Assume that the access point has collected all nodes' costs, and the network structure G. Then, this access point can compute the payment to all relay nodes in a centralized manner. The very naive way to calculate the payment for all nodes on Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ is to calculate every node's payment using Dijkstra's algorithm. In the worst case, there will be OðnÞ nodes on Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ, so this naive algorithm will result in a time complexity Oðn 2 log n þ nmÞ. In [20] , Hershberger and Suri provided a fast payment calculation algorithm for edge weighted graph (by assuming the edges are rational agents). Nardelli et al. [21] studied a similar question of finding the most vital node of a shortest path in an edge weighted graph and gave a method to do so in time Oðm þ n log nÞ. Borrowing some ideas from [20] , we present an Oðn log n þ mÞ time complexity algorithm for fast payment calculation in a node weighted graph.
Consider a node v k 2 Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ and we want to compute kP Àvk ðv i ; v 0 ; dÞk. The basic idea of our algorithm is for a pair of nodes v a , v b such that v a v b 2 G, we calculate the path P Àv k ðv i ; v a ; dÞ and P Àv k ðv b ; v 0 ; dÞ separately. Then, by concatenating P Àvk ðv i ; v a ; dÞ, link v a v b , and P Àvk ðv i ; v a ; dÞ, we obtain the path with the minimum cost from v i to v 0 without node v k and having v a v b on it. Choosing the minimal cost path for all edges v a v b 2 G, we find kP Àvk ðv i ; v 0 ; dÞk. See Fig. 1 for an illustration.
Algorithm 1 computes the payment for all nodes on the least cost path. The correctness of this algorithm comes from the following observations of the shortest v k -avoiding path. 
Find a node v r l 2 Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ such that removing node v r l causes that node v k neither connects to v i nor connects to v j in the tree SP T ðv i Þ. Fig. 2 . Similarly, we assume that Pðv k ; v 0 ; dÞ is composed of two subpaths P 2 and v ra v raþ1 Á Á Á v rsÀ1 v rs . Let P 3 be the subpath v r a v r aþ1 Á Á Á v r lÀ1 v r l . It is easy to show that kP 2 k þ kP 3 k kP 1 k from the property of least cost path Pðv i ; v k ; dÞ and kP 1 k þ kP 3 k kP 2 k from the property of least cost path Pðv k ; v 0 ; dÞ. Consequently, we have kP 3 k 0, which is a contradiction. This finishes our proof.
t u
Similarly, we have: The proof of this lemma is omitted due to space limit. Lemma 3 allows us to only focus on the path connecting v k and v 0 that avoids nodes
Now, we analyze the time complexity of this algorithm. First, the shortest path tree can be calculated in Oðn log n þ mÞ and, with the SPT, it only takes us linear time to find Lðv k Þ and Rðv k Þ. Clearly, we can compute the level for all nodes in time OðnÞ. We can calculate the value R Àl ðv k Þ for all nodes v k in time Oðn log n þ mÞ. Assume the number of nodes with label l is n l and node v k 0 s degree is degðv k Þ, then it will take at most P v l :level¼l degðv k Þ þ n l log n l time to find c Àl . Summing l from 1 to s À 1, the time complexity as P degðv k Þ þ P sÀ1 l¼1 n l log n l < 2m þ n log n. Thus, computing R Àl ðv k Þ and c Àl will take time complexity of Oðn log n þ mÞ. The heap operations have at most m insertions, m deletions, and n extract-min operations, which takes time Oðm þ n log nÞ. Overall, the time complexity is still Oðm þ n log nÞ.
Distributed Algorithm for Payment Calculation
Unlike wired or cellular networks, wireless ad hoc networks are lack of a centralized authority. Thus, it is more desirable to compute the payment in a distributed manner. Next, we discuss how to compute the payment of a node to all the relay nodes truthfully in a distributed manner. Assume that there is a fixed destination node v 0 . Our distributed algorithm will compute the payment of each node v i to all its relay nodes. The distributed algorithm has two stages. First, all nodes together find the Shortest Path Tree (SPT) rooted at node v 0 . We assume that the SPT tree does not have a loop. This step can be easily implemented using Dijkstra's algorithm, so we omit this one. Assume that we already formed a shortest path tree T rooted at node v 0 , and every node knows its parent and children in tree T . Second, every node v i computes its payment p k i in a distributed manner using Algorithm 2, which is based on the algorithm presented in [22] . 
Compute the Payment Truthfully
While it is quite obvious to conceive that the node v i has the incentive not to correctly calculate his payment p k i in the second stage, it is not so straightforward to notice that the node v i also has the incentive to lie about his shortest path even in the first stage. We give an example to show that even we can guarantee that node v i calculates his payment truthfully in the second stage, it is not unnecessary for us to worry about nodes' lying in the first stage. In Fig. 3 
. Now, it only needs to pay v 5 5 to send a packet. Thus, node v 1 benefits by lying about its neighborhood connection information, which consequently changes the SPT. This problem rises from the fact that the least cost path is not necessarily the path that you pay the least. This observation also raises the concern whether a distributed method presented in [22] does compute the payment correctly since a node can lie not only about its cost, but also about its neighborhood information.
Notice that the distributed method to compute the payment relies on the selfish node v i to calculate the payment p k i to node v k , which cannot prevent node v i from manipulating the calculation in its favor. In [22] , the authors suggested to use the following approach: All agents are required to sign all messages that they sent and to verify all messages that they received from their neighbors. They claimed that their protocol can be modified so that all forms of cheating by agents are detectable. Observe that, they did not consider the possible scenario when an agent could lie about the topology (the scenario we just discussed in previous paragraph). Notice that even using their approach, all nodes must keep a record of messages sent to and received from its neighbors so that an audit can be performed later if a disagreement happens.
Next, we present a new distributed method that prevents nodes from lying about the topology, and miscalculating the payment, and it does not need to store all messages. The nodes use Algorithm 3 to compute the shortest distance to source and then use Algorithm 4 to compute the payment to the relay nodes. It is easy to verify that they are truthful and no node will lie about its neighbor information and will follow the payment calculation procedure. For the example illustrated in Fig. 3 node v i contacts v j directly using reliable and secure connection, asking v j to update his Dðv j Þ to Dðv i Þ þ c i and F Hðv j Þ to v i . After the necessary updating, v j must broadcast his information. 7: Node v i broadcasts its information to its neighbors. Node v j will then be punished accordingly, e.g., v j is dropped from the network by all nodes.
Algorithm 4 Truthful Distributed Payment
Computation by v i 1: Set p k i 1, if v k 2 Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ; otherwise, p k i 0. 2: Broadcasts its entries p k i to its neighbors. 3: while v i received information p k j from its neighbor v j do 4: v i updates p
OTHER ISSUES OF PRICING MECHANISM
Collusion of Nodes
So far, we have assumed that the wireless nodes do not collude to improve their utilities. In practice, the nodes may collude with each other in the hope to gain as a group. There are several possible ways such that some nodes can collude. For example, if two nodes v k1 and v k2 know that the removal of them will disconnect some nodes from the access point, then these two nodes can collude to declare arbitrarily large costs and charge a monopoly price together. Notice that, by declaring much higher costs together, one node's utility may decrease, but the sum of their utilities is guaranteed to increase (thus, they share the increased utilities).
We point out here that the collusion of nodes discussed here is different from the traditional group strategyproof concept studied in [23] , [24] . A pricing mechanism is said to be group strategyproof in [23] , [24] if any subset of agents colludes, then each agent of this subset cannot improve its utility without decreasing the utility of some other agent. Clearly, this formulation of group strategyproofness cannot capture the scenario when the profit can be transferred among all colluding nodes, which happens very often in real world. We then formally define what is k-agents strategyproof mechanism as follows: Definition 1. A mechanism is said to be k-agents strategyproof if, when any subset of agents of size k colludes, the overall utility of this subset is made worse off by misreporting their types. A mechanism is true group strategyproof if it is k-agents strategyproof for any k.
Clearly, we cannot design a true group strategyproof mechanism for the unicast routing problem studied here: If all nodes but node v i collude and declare arbitrarily high costs, then node v i has to pay a payment arbitrarily higher than the actual payment it needs to pay if these nodes do not collude.
Directly from the incentive compatibility property, for any truthful mechanism, we have: Proof. From Lemma 4, we know w i ðo; c i Þ does not depend on c i since we assume the output o is not changed when node v i declares d i instead of c i . Thus, we just need to prove that its utility does not depend on any other nodes' declared cost. We prove it by contradiction. Assume its utility u i ðdÞ depends on a node v k 0 s declared cost d k , then there exist two numbers d k 1 
Without loss of generality, we assume that 
We first consider the case < 0. Considering the graph with profile c ¼ ðdj i d i1 Þ, clearly node v i is not on the LCP and its utility is P i . Thus, the sum of node v k and v i 0 s utility, when node v i declares Clearly, node v i is on the LCP and its utility is P i À c i . Thus, the sum of node v k and v i 0 s utility, when 
The last inequality comes from 
which is a contradiction. This finishes our proof. t u
The above lemma implies that, for any 2-agents strategyproof mechanism for unicast, the payment to any node v k , regardless of the cost profile, is a constant as long as v k is on the LCP; the payment to any node v k , regardless of the cost profile, is another constant as long as v k is not on the LCP. Theorem 1. There is no 2-agents strategyproof mechanism for unicast problem if the output is the LCP.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Assume A is a 2-agents strategyproof mechanism. From Lemma 6, we know that if node v k is on LCP then its payment is P , else its payment is P . Now, consider a profile d of their declared costs, and v k in on LCP. Given a fixed d Àk , there exists a k > 0 such that v k is on LCP if and only if d k a k . It is easy to see that a k ¼ P Àv k ðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ À Pðv i ; v 0 ; dj k 0Þ and P À P ¼ a k (otherwise, node v k can lie about its cost to improve its utility). In other words, P À P ¼ kP Àv k ðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ À Pðv i ; v 0 ; dj k 0Þk depends on d, which is a contradiction to the requirement that both P and P are fixed constants. This finishes our proof. t u Theorem 1 relieves us from designing any k-agents strategyproof when the objective is to use the least cost path for routing. In the following discussions, we study how to design a truthful mechanism such that it can prevent nodes from colluding with its one-hop neighbors. Notice that the VCG payment scheme discussed in Section 3.1 does not prevent a node from colluding with its neighbors at all. It is not difficult to construct an example such that, for a node v k 2 Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ, the path P Àvk ðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ uses a node v t that is a neighbor of v k and v t 6 2 Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ. Then, v t can lie its cost up to increase the utility of node v k .
Assume that node v i pays other nodes to relay the data to another node v j . Let Nðv k Þ be the set of neighbors of node v k , including node v k itself. Thus, to have a payment scheme that prevents collusion between any two neighboring nodes, it is necessary that the graph resulted by removing Nðv k Þ still has a path connecting v i and v j . Therefore, we assume that graph GnNðv k Þ is connected for any node v k . Similar to the payment scheme presented in Section 3.1 when nodes do not collude, we design the following payment schemep p that avoids the collusion between any two neighboring nodes. The paymentp p k i ðdÞ to a node v k is
where P ÀNðvkÞ ðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ is the least cost path connecting v i and v j in graph GnNðv k Þ without using any node in Nðv k Þ. Notice that the payment to a node v k 6 2 Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ could be positive when node v k has a neighbor on Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ. This is a sharp difference to our first payment scheme based on VCG.
We then prove that the payment schemep p is indeed truthful.
Theorem 2. The payment schemep p is a strategyproof mechanism that prevents any two neighboring nodes from colluding.
Proof. Clearly, each individual node will be truthful since our mechanism belongs to the family of VCG mechanisms. Notice for any two neighboring nodes v k and v l , their utilities can be written as
Summarizing them, we get
Notice that h Àk ðc ÀNðvkÞ Þ þ h Àl ðc ÀNðvlÞ Þ does not depend on d l and d k since v k and v l are neighbors of each other. In addition, P v i ðoðcÞ; c i Þ is maximized when they reveal their true costs. Thus, v k and v l will maximize their total utilities by revealing their true costs. t u
It is easy to show that the above payment scheme is optimum in terms of the payment to each individual node when the output is the least cost path. The proof is omitted due to space limit.
Furthermore, we can extend the above scheme to a more general case when we want to prevent some groups of nodes from colluding. Let fQðv 1 Þ; Qðv 2 Þ; Á Á Á ; Qðv n Þg be a set of subsets of nodes, i.e., Qðv k Þ & V . We then show how to design a truthful mechanism such that any node v k cannot collude with other nodes in Qðv k Þ to increase their total utilities. For simplicity, assume that v k 2 Qðv k Þ, for 1 k n. It is easy to show that the following mechanism is truthful: 1) the output is the least cost path connecting the source v i and destination v 0 ; 2) the paymentp p Obviously, we need graph GnQðv k Þ to be connected for any node v k .
Link Cost Instead of Node Cost
So far, we assumed that the cost of a node forwarding data to any neighbor is same, i.e., the cost is incurred on each node. However, each node could have different costs of forwarding data to different neighbors by using power adjustment technique. Thus, we assume that each wireless node v i has a private type c i ¼ ðc i;0 ; c i;1 ; Á Á Á ; c i;nÀ1 Þ. Here, c i;j is its power cost to support the link to a node v j . If node v i cannot reach node v j , then the power cost is assumed to be 1. Obviously, c i;i ¼ 0. Notice that this model of network is different from the network models used by previous strategyproof pricing mechanisms [4] , [22] for unicast. In their models, either a link is an agent, which has a computational power and private cost type, or a node is an agent, which has computational power and the private scalar cost to carry the transit traffic. In our new model here, we treat each node as an agent and it has some private type which is a vector. The valuation of a node is solely determined by which incident link is used in the optimal solution. Specifically, given an output (a path v is ; v isÀ1 ; Á Á Á v i1 ; v i0 connecting node v i to v 0 , where v i ¼ v i s and v 0 ¼ v i 0 ), the valuation w i k ðc i k ; oÞ of the node v ik is Àc ik;ikÀ1 . Given the declared types by all wireless nodes, the mechanism will compute a path that maximizes the valuation of all nodes, and a pricing scheme p that is strategyproof.
The strategyproof pricing mechanism works as follows. First, each node v i declares its cost vector d i , which is a n-ary vector itself. We then define a directed and weighted graph G ¼ ðQ; E; W Þ, where the weight of a directed link v i v j is d i;j . A least cost directed path Pðv i ; v 0 ; dÞ is computed to connect v i to v 0 , which is the output. Let x k;j ðd; i; 0Þ be the indicator of whether a directed link v k v j is on the directed path from v i to v 0 . The payment p k i ðdÞ to node v k is P j x k;j ðd; i; 0Þd k;j þ Á i;k . Here, Á i;k is the improvement of the least cost path from v i to the access point due to the existence of node v k . In other words,
x r;j ðdj k 1; i; 0Þd r;j À X r;j x r;j ðd; i; 0Þd r;j :
Notice, to calculate the least cost v k -avoiding-path, we set
It is not difficult to show that, under the above payment model, every node (except the source node) could not lie about its cost vector to improve its profit. We assume that the source node will not lie about its cost vector. Then, the above payment scheme is truthful. We can show that the fast payment scheme based on Algorithm 1 can be modified to compute the payment in time Oðn log n þ mÞ when each node is an agent in a link-weighted directed network. Notice that, in this network model, the source node could lie about its cost vector such that its total payment to all relay nodes will decrease.
Ratio of Total Payment over Total Cost of the Path
Clearly, node v i pays each node on Pðv i ; v 0 ; cÞ more than its actual cost to make sure that it will not lie about its cost. The overpaid value is the improvement of the least cost path due to the existence of node v k . It is not difficult to construct a network example such that the overpayment of a node v i could be arbitrarily large. But, on the other hand, when we conducted extensive simulations to study the amount of overpayment when the cost of each node is chosen independently and uniformly from a range and the network topology is a random graph, the result shows that the large overpayment usually will not happen in the real world. Let p i ¼ P v k 2Pðv i ;v 0 ;cÞ p k i ðcÞ, i.e., the total payment of node v i to the relay nodes. The metrics of the overpayment used in our simulations are Total Overpayment Ratio (TOR), Individual Overpayment Ratio (IOR), and Worst Overpayment Ratio. The TOR of a graph is defined as P i p i = P i kPðv i ; v 0 ; cÞk, i.e., the total payment of all nodes over the total cost of all LCPs. The IOR of a graph is defined as 1 n P i pi kPðvi;v0;cÞk , i.e., the average overpayment ratio over all n nodes. The worst overpayment ratio is defined as max i p i kPðvi;v0;cÞk , i.e., the maximum overpayment ratio over all n nodes. We found that the IOR and TOR are almost the same in all our simulations and they take values around 1.5. In all our simulations, the average and the maximum are taken over 100 random instances.
In the first simulation, we randomly generate n nodes uniformly in a 2; 000m Â 2; 000m region. The transmission range of each node is set as 300m. The cost of each node v i to forward a packet to any neighbor is c 1 þ c 2 Á r , where r is fixed at 300. Here, random number c 1 takes value from 300 to 500 and c 2 takes a random value from 10 to 50. The ranges of c 1 and c 2 we used here reflect the actual power cost in one second of a node to send data at 2Mbps rate. The number of nodes in our simulations varies among 100; 150; 200; Á Á Á ; 500. We choose two different values 2 and 2.5. Fig. 4a illustrates the difference between IOR and TOR when graph model is UDG and ¼ 2. We found that these two metrics are almost the same and both of them are stable when the number of nodes increases. Fig. 4d illustrates the overpayment respecting to the hop distance to the source node. The average overpayment ratio of node stays almost stable regardless of the hop distance to the source. The maximum overpayment ratio decreases when the hop distance increases, which is because large hop distance to the source node will smooth off the oscillation of the relay costs' difference: For a node closer to the access point, the second shortest path could be much larger than the shortest path, which in turn incurs large overpayment; for a node far away from the access point, the second shortest path has total cost almost the same as the shortest path, which in turn incurs small overpayment. Keep in mind that the payment indeed increases when the hop distance to the source increases. Fig. 4b and Fig. 4c illustrate the overpayment for UDG graph when ¼ 2 and ¼ 2:5, respectively.
In our second simulation, we study the performance of our payment methods when each individual nodes have different transmission ranges instead of the same transmission ranges studied before. The cost c i of a node v i to send a packet to its neighbors is c 1 þ c 2 jjr i jj . Here, the transmission range r i of node i takes a random value from ½100; 500. Fig. 4e and Fig. 4f illustrate the overpayment for random networks when ¼ 2 and ¼ 2:5, respectively. Similar observations were obtained for these simulations.
Other Issues about the Pricing Mechanism
Other possible attacks. There are some other attacks possible to the scheme. A source node may refuse to pay by claiming that he is not the source of the communication and thus should not pay for it. To counter this attack, we require that each node sign the message when it initiates the message, the relay nodes will verify the signature.
Another possible attack is free riding: A relay node v k on the route Pðv i ; v 0 ; cÞ may attempt to piggyback data on the packets sent between the initiator v i with the goal of not having to pay for the communications to node v 0 . To counter this attack, the initiator v i pays the relay node v k only when it receives a signed acknowledgment from the access point v 0 .
Where to pay. We briefly discuss how the payment is charged. All payment transactions are conducted at the access point v 0 . Each node v i has a secure account at node v 0 . There are two scenarios here. The first scenario is that the access point v 0 receives a data from v i . Node v 0 verifies the truthfulness of the source and then pays each node v k on the LCP p k i and charges that from node v i . The second scenario is that a node v i retrieves data from node v 0 . A relay node v k on the LCP will send a signed acknowledgment after relaying the data to the next hop v j . The acknowledgment to v 0 by v k includes the authentication from v j that v k does send data to v j . Node v 0 then pays node v k and charges node v i accordingly after receiving this signed acknowledgment.
A better way to prevent these attacks described before may be to combine the efficient pricing mechanism presented here with the payment management method presented by Jacobsson [8] , which we leave as a future work.
Mobility and dynamic cost. Our protocols assumed that the network topology does not change for the period time of computing the least cost path, computing the payment, and routing packets from the source to the access point. When wireless nodes move, the above protocol still works as long as the network topology does not change. When the mobility triggers the change of the network topology, our protocol has to update the path, and the payment calculated accordingly. A node will be compensated for only the portion of the traffic it relayed.
For simplicity, we assumed that the cost of each node is fixed for the moment. When the cost of a node changes, the node has to declare its new cost. This will trigger the change of the least cost paths and consequently the payment to nodes in the network. The cost could change due to its battery power changes, the competition among other nodes changes, and so on.
So far, we only concentrate on one session of routing. For the successive sessions, the source node and the access point already know the "actual" cost of all relay nodes. It is natural to ask how much we should pay the relay nodes for later sessions now? One may think that we could pay these nodes their declared costs now. It is not difficult to construct an example such that this simple mechanism is not truthful: A relay node could misreport its cost initially; although its payment for the first session could decrease, but the gain in later sessions is large enough to cover this initial loss. We actually can prove that for successive sessions the source node still has to pay the relay nodes based on the payment scheme described before. The result is omitted here due to space limit. Notice that another reason we could not pay a relay node v k its declared cost d k is that node v k could simply refuse to relay since it gains nothing by relaying.
Resale the path. Another possible collusion happens after the payment is calculated and during the process of actually routing the packets. Let p i ¼ P nÀ1 k¼0 p k i , i.e., the total payment of node v i to all relay nodes on the least cost path Pðv i ; v 0 ; cÞ. Assume that p i > p j þ maxðp to forward the data packets using its LCP to v 0 . Node v 8 pays node v 4 a price 6 þ 5 ¼ 11 to cover its payment p 4 and its cost c 4 , and half of the savings, which is 4:5. Thus, the total payment of node v 8 is only 15.5 now, which is less than p 8 and node v 4 also increases its utility from 0 to 4.5. Currently, we are not aware of any method that can prevent this from happening. We may argue, on the other side, that it may be not necessary to prevent this from happening since this actually encourages some kind of cooperations among nodes.
RELATED WORK
Routing has been part of the algorithmic mechanism-design from the beginning. Nisan and Ronen [4] provided a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism for optimal route selection in a centralized computational model. In their formulation, each edge e of the graph is an agent and has a private cost c e of sending a unit data along this edge. Their payment scheme falls into the family of VCG mechanisms. Feigenbaum et al. [22] then addressed the truthful low cost routing in a different network model. They assumed that each node k incurs a transit cost c k for each transit packet it carries. Their payment scheme again is also a VCG mechanism. They also gave a distributed method such that each node i can compute the payment to node k for carrying the transit traffic from node i to node j if node k is on the LCP from i to j. Since the mechanism is truthful, any node cannot lie its cost to improve its profit in their distributed algorithm. However, as they pointed out [22] , it is unclear how to prevent these selfish nodes from running a different algorithms in computing a payment that is more favorable to themselves since we have to rely on these nodes to run the distributed algorithm, although we know that the nodes will input their true values. Anderegg and Eidenbenz [25] recently proposed a routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks based on the VCG mechanism. They assumed that each node is a selfish agent, and incurs a privately known cost when communicating with a neighbor. In their model, the cost from a node v to a node u may be different from the cost from node u to a node v, i.e., being asymmetric.
Some researchers use totally different methods to deal with selfish wireless networks. We briefly review some of them as follows. Marti et al. [9] proposed a scheme based on credibility of nodes. They call a node misbehaving if it originally agrees to relay traffic but does not actually. The routing protocol will avoid using these misbehaving nodes. Buttyan et al. [7] , [8] , [11] , [10] presented a sequence of methods to stimulate cooperation among nodes and to prevent nodes from overloading the network. A key idea behind their protocols is that we should compensate nodes providing a service, and charge nodes receiving a service. In their protocols, each node maintains a counter, called nuglet counter, in a tamper resistant hardware module. The value of nuglet always remains positive. When a node sends packets to other node, it pays each relay node 1 nuglet, and its nuglet counter is decreased by the hops of the path used. These approaches can be viewed as a fixed price payment. Srinivasan et al. [12] proposed two acceptance algorithms, which are used by each wireless node to decide whether to relay the traffic for other node. In [13] , Srinivasan et al. proposed an acceptance algorithm called GTFT and they proved that GTFT results in Nash equilibrium. Salem et al. [26] presented a charging and rewarding scheme for packet forwarding in multihop cellular networks. In their network model, there is a base-station to forward the packets. They use symmetric cryptography to cope with the lying.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we gave a strategyproof pricing mechanism that stimulates cooperation for unicast among wireless ad hoc networks. In our strategyproof scheme, each node v k first declares its cost of relaying data for other nodes, node v i then computes the least cost path to the access point v 0 , and a payment is also computed for each relay node on the least cost path. We presented the first centralized algorithm with optimal time-complexity to compute such payment. We also discussed in detail how to implement this scheme on each selfish node in a distributed manner. We showed that although each node is selfish, the proposed scheme guarantees that each node will declare its true cost and also follow the designed protocol. As all truthful mechanisms, the proposed scheme pays each relay node more than its declared cost to prevent it from lying. We conducted extensive simulations and found that practically the overpayment is small when the cost of each node is a random value between some range.
Our protocol assumes that nodes will not collude. We showed that no truthful mechanism can prevent all pairs of nodes from colluding to improve their utilities. We designed a truthful payment scheme that can prevent nodes from colluding with its neighbors. Our payment scheme is optimum in terms of the individual payment.
In this paper, we assumed that the cost of a node is fixed (at least for one communicating session). In practice, the cost of a node may be dynamic, e.g., it may depend on other ongoing traffics, depend on its remaining battery power, or even depend on the competition by other nodes. A successful study of the static cost model will pave a way for studying the dynamic cost model. We leave designing payment schemes for dynamic cost model as a future work.
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